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 Whose Number is it anyway?: Common Legal Representation, Consultations and the 





Ensuring effective and meaningful participation by large numbers of victims of international 
crimes continues to pose significant challenges for the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
This is evident in WKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRISURYLVLRQVLQWKH,&&¶V5XOHVof Procedure and 
Evidence concerning the appointment of lawyers to represent victim participants. These allow 
the Chamber to request victims to choose common representation. Making provision for 
victims to choose is, however, far easier than ensuring that that choice is appropriately 
achieved in practice. Typically WKH,&&¶VRegistry consults with victims before presenting a 
report for consideration by the Chamber. These reports may, as in the proceedings in the 
Ntaganda case considered here, contain statistical indicators to express some of the outcomes 
of its consultations with victims. This practice, has, we suggest, resulted in the emergence of 
what can be termed WKHµVWDWLVWLFDOYLFWLP¶Consultations with victims are important and 
welcome.  However, we strike a cautionary note about the turn to statistics. The use of 
statistics can bolster institutional interests in debates about representation, thereby impacting 
upon the portrayal (and therefore the management) of dissent on the part of victim 
participants at the ICC.  This is a matter of particular concern when what is at stake is how 
victims might be able to contest the current arrangements in place for their legal 
representation.  In hLJKOLJKWLQJWKHHPHUJHQFHRIWKHµVWDWLVWLFDOYLFWLP¶ we seek to contribute 
to wider debates about the representation of victims in international criminal law as well as 
indirectly to discussions about measuring victim satisfaction. 
 




On 16 March 2015 the Registry of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a report on a 
set of consultations it had carried out with victim participants in the Ntaganda case.1 This 
Report formed part of the process for determining what, if any, changes should be made to 
YLFWLPV¶ legal representation for the trial phase of the proceedings.  It recorded that 81% of 
the victim participants consulted indicated that they wished to continue with the arrangements 
for representation that the Chamber had earlier put in place for the pre-trial phase.   The 
Report also noted other striking statistical information arising from the consultation exercise. 
Taking this and other factors into account the majority of the Trial Chamber decided that 
there ZHUHµQRFRPSHOOLQJUHDVRQV¶to replace the vLFWLPV¶ current legal representatives with 
alternative counsel.2 Expressing the results RIFRQVXOWDWLRQVDERXWDUUDQJHPHQWVIRUYLFWLPV¶
legal representation numerically represents a new and interesting departure from existing 
practice, one which has featured ± albeit less prominently - in other ICC cases.3  We suggest 
this development heralds the potential advent of the µVWDWLVWLFDOYLFWLP¶ 4  The appearance of 
the statistical victim can be seen as a by-product of a well-intentioned desire to ensure that 
consultations with victim participants contribute to the choice of their legal representative.  
                                                 
 Kent Law School, University of Kent, Canterbury. [e.haslam@kent.ac.uk] 
 Department of Law, Queen Mary University of London. [r.edmunds@qmul.ac.uk] We are grateful to the 
anonymous referees for their helpful comments. 
1
 5HJLVWU\¶V5HSRUWRQ&RQVXOWDWLRQVZLWK9LFWLPV3XUVXDQWWR'HFLVLRQ,&&-01/04-02/06-449, Ntaganda (ICC-
01/04-02/06-5HJLVWU\0DUFKKHUHDIWHUWKHµ5HJLVWU\¶V5HSRUW¶ 
2




 See Directions on the conduct of the proceedings, Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudè (ICC-02/11-01/15-
205), Trial Chamber I, 3 August 2015, § 69; and First Report on Applications to Participate in the Proceedings, 
Ongwen (ICC-02/04-01/15-303), Registry, 18 September 2015.  
4
 On the µUHDO¶DQGµLPDJLQHG¶YLFWLPVHH/()OHWFKHUµ5HIUDFWHGMXVWLFH7KH,magined victim and the 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO&RXUW¶LQ&. De Vos, S Kendall and C. Stahn (eds), Contested Justice: The Politics and 
Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions  (Cambridge: CUP, 2015) 302-2QWKHµMXULGLILHG¶
DQGµDEVWUDFW¶YLFWLP, VHH6.HQGDOODQG61RXZHQµ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQDO3UDFWLFHVDWWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO
Court: The Gap Between Juridified and AEVWUDFW9LFWLPKRRG¶Law and Contemporary Problems (2013) 
235-262.  On statistical indicators and human rights, see 6(0HUU\µ0HDVXULQJWKH:RUOG,QGLFDWRUV+XPDQ
5LJKWVDQG*OREDO*RYHUQDQFH¶52, Supplement 3, Current Anthropology (2011), S 83-95. 
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However, we suggest that the emergence of the statistical victim is not without its dangers.  It 
contributes to a wider climate of institutional management within the ICC, which seeks to 
EULGJHWKHJDSEHWZHHQWKHIRUPDOHPSKDVLVRQYLFWLPV¶ULJKWWRFKRRVHOHJDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ, 
on the one hand, and what the Registry and the Chambers regard as achievable in practice on 
the other.  That is not to claim that the Court must never limit victim participation, nor is it to 
deny that one of the Court¶V important tasks is to balance the interests of different 
participants, including victims, in international criminal justice. However, how it sets about 
meeting the considerable challenges of doing this invites critical scrutiny.  Statistics have a 
particular quality that can affect, in fundamental ways, the representation of what they seek to 
measure and portray.  Within this context the emergence of the statistical victim can have the 
effect of shifting the terms of debates about representation in favour of institutional interests.  
Effective representation is vital to meaningful victim participation. Achieving it depends in 
no so small measure on involving victims as fully and directly as possible in choosing their 
representative. There is a risk that recording preferences statistically may do more to promote 
the appearance of choice than it does to help focus upon how best to realise its achievement 
in practice.   By UDLVLQJTXHVWLRQVDERXWWKHHIIHFWRIWKH,&&¶VWXUQWRVWDWLVWLFDOLQGLFDWRUV we 
seek to contribute to ongoing scholarly discussions about the ways in which victims are 
represented in international criminal law,5 as well as, albeit indirectly, to generate further 
discussion on how to measure victim satisfaction.   
 
 A key part of iQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPLQDOODZ¶V claim to authority and legitimacy has come to be 
linked to the idea that it represents and speaks for the interests of victims of international 
                                                 
5
 See, for example, Kendall and Nouwen, supra note 4.  For an empirical study of representation practices at the 
,&&DQG(&&&VHH5.LOOHDQDQG/0RIIHWWµ9LFWLP/HJDO5HSUHVHQWDWLRQEHIRUHWKH,&&DQG(&&&¶
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2017) 1-28. 
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crime.6  Victim participation at the ICC is one of the main sites for the realisation and testing 
of this claim.  Despite the general enthusiasm with which the institution of victim 
participation was initially welcomed, it is widely accepted that in the years since it has 
become operational, the ICC has struggled to make victim participation effective.   Questions 
of representation are central in this struggle.  These questions operate on at least two different 
levels.    Victims are highly represented subjects in a number of different senses.  First, in 
most cases legal representation will be vital if victim participants are to participate 
effectively.7  This is one of the many reasons why recent judicial developments at the ICC 
concerning the appointment of legal representatives for victims have proved to be 
controversial.  Second, when different actors ± whether they be intermediaries, judges, the 
Registry, counsel and NGOs - claim to speak for or about victims they make a depiction 
(explicitly or implicitly) of victims. These portrayals are, however, representations that may 
more or less reflect the actual victim(s) encompassed in these claims.8 The argument put 
forward here - that the advent of the statistical victim has the potential to shift debates about 
representation in favour of institutional interests - draws on the practices of representation in 
each of these two, interlinked senses, namely: the practice of representation in the sense of 
the legal technique of speaking for another; and, the practice of representation in the sense of 
portraying another subject, in this case, victims at the ICC.  
                                                 
6
 See Kendall and Nouwen, supra QRWH2QWKHWHQVLRQEHWZHHQWKLVFODLPDQGDµVKDUHKROGHU¶ORJLFRI
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPLQDOMXVWLFHVHH6.HQGDOOµ&RPPRGLI\LQJ*OREDO-XVWLFH(FRQRPLHVRI$FFRXQWDELOLW\DWWKH
International CriminDO&RXUW¶13 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2015) 113-134. On the 
FRQVWLWXHQFLHVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPLQDOODZDQGWKHLULQYRFDWLRQVVHH)0pJUHWµ,QZKRVHQDPH"7KH,&&DQG
the search for constituency in, C. De Vos, S. Kendall and C. Stahn (eds.), Contested Justice: The Politics and 
Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (Cambridge: CUP, 2015) 23-45 (and, on victims more 
particularly, at 36-42).   
7
 Not least because victims who are legally represented benefit from greater participatory rights, see Decision on 
Legal Representation, Appointment of Counsel for the Defence, Protective Measures and Time-limit for 
Submission of Observations on Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to 
a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, Kony et al (ICC-02/04-01/05-134), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 1 February 
2007, § 7. 
8
 Fletcher, supra note 4, at 312-313. See further Killean and Moffett, supra QRWH:*:HUQHUµ³:HFDQQRW
DOORZRXUVHOYHVWRLPDJLQHZKDWLWDOOPHDQV´'RFXPHQWDU\3UDFWLFHVDQGWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO&RXUW¶
Law and Contemporary Problems (2013) 319-DQG&6FKZĘEHO-3DWHOµ6SHFWDFOHLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOFULPLQDO
law: WKHIXQGUDLVLQJLPDJHRIYLFWLPKRRG¶London Review of International Law (2016) 247-274.   
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The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 traces the current legal position and practice 
surrounding the appointment of common legal representation at the ICC. The organisation of 
legal representation for victim participants at the ICC has become highly controlled and 
managerial. This tendency is likely to intensify as the search continues for ways to balance 
meaningful victim participation on the one hand against an efficient and fair trial on the other. 
The third section sets out the procedure that was followed for the arrangement of common 
legal representation in the trial phase in the Ntaganda case.  This section explores the 
consultation exercise the Registry conducted with victims and, specifically, the way in which 
the Report the Registry presented to the Chamber expressed some of YLFWLPV¶ views through 
the shorthand form of statistics.  In the fourth section we identify potential pitfalls in relying 
upon statistics and argue that the recourse to statistical indicators to encapsulate YLFWLPV¶
preferences has the potential to shift the balance of the debates concerning representation 
further towards institutional interests. This is especially concerning when what is at stake is 
the question of representing victims who contest the current arrangements about their legal 
representation. In these ways we sound a cautionary note about the emergence of the 
statistical victim. Notwithstanding its origins in a well-meant and important move to consult 
with victims, the focus on data may inadvertently deflect attention from the substantive 
challenge of how best to maximise victims¶FKRLFHLQWKHVHOHFWLRQRItheir legal 
representative.  The turn to statistics is not however without an ironic twist.  The final section 
argues that by putting statistical indicators on the record, the emergence of the statistical 
victim has the paradoxical consequence of highlighting the existence of contestation about 
representation, enabling the figures to be read back against the Court.  
Page 6 of 32 
 
2. The Challenges of Managing Representation under the Rome 
Statute 
Effective legal representation is central to ensuring successful victim participation at the ICC. 
Providing such representation depends in part upon appointing high quality legal 
professionals who are accessible to victim participants. It follows that how victims are 
involved in selecting their lawyers is critical.  However, perhaps surprisingly, the Rome 
Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) contain relatively little about legal 
representation itself.  Moreover, over time, the Court has increasingly come to construe the 
relevant provisions in ways that prioritise the managerial needs of the trial process, 
constrained, as they are, by budgetary and other resource pressures, over ensuring that 
victims are actively involved in selecting their own counsel.9  Admittedly the institutional 
interest in delivering efficient and speedy trials is also likely to be in the interests of many 
victims. However, there remains a risk that the way the Court currently sets about 
implementing the provisions for the appointment of common legal representation, including 
the level of direct involvement of victims in the process, may have the effect of presenting 
YLFWLPV¶interests as homogenous, and of minimising the space for the expression of dissent. 
Excising the complex range of voices and perspectives from the legal record and decision-
making processes can be problematic,10 not just for individual victims, but also for 
international criminal justice more broadly.  
 
                                                 
9
 See E. Haslam and R. (GPXQGVµ&RPPRQ/HJDO5HSUHVHQWDWLRQDWWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO&RXUW0RUH
Symbolic than Real?¶ 12 International Criminal Law Review (2012) 871-903; M.-L. Hebert-'ROEHFµ7RZDUGV
Bureaucratization: An Analysis of Common Legal Representation Practices Before the International Criminal 
&RXUW¶, 34 Revue Quebecoise de Droit International (2015) 35-61; /:DOOH\Qµ9LFWLPV¶3DUWLFLSDWLRQLQ,CC 
3URFHHGLQJV&KDOOHQJHV$KHDG¶International Criminal Law Review (2016) 995-1017; and S. Vasiliev, 
µ9LFWLP3DUWLFLSDWLRQ5HYLVLWHG:KDWWKH,&&LV/HDUQLQJDERXW,WVHOI¶LQ&DUVWHQ6WDKQ (ed.), The Law and 
Practice of the International Criminal Court (Oxford: OUP, 2015), 1133-12012QWKHµQHROLEHUDORULHQWDWLRQ¶
of international criminal law, see Kendall, supra note 6, at 117. 
10
 See Haslam and Edmunds, supra note 9, at 886-DQGµVictim participation, politics and the construction 
of victims at the international criminal court: Reflections on proceedings in Banda and Jerbo¶, 14(2) Melbourne 
Journal of International Law (2013) 727-747.  
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Choice of counsel LVUHFRJQLVHGLQWKH,&&¶VOHJDOIUDPHZRUNRule 90(1) RPE ICC provides 
that victims are µfree to choose a legal representative¶. However, under Rule 90(3) RPE ICC 
Chambers can request victims to choose a common legal representative. Although the Rule 
refers to the possibility of Registry assistance in making their choice, this assistance is not 
extensive.11 Where victim participants are themselves unable to choose a common legal 
representative within a set time period, the Chamber can ask the Registry to select one for 
them.  The Chambers decide when the effectiveness of the proceedings calls for such 
common legal representation.  According to Rule 90(4) RPE ICC they must take into account 
WKHµGLVWLQFWLQWHUHVWVRIWKHYLFWLPV¶DQGDYRLGconflicts of interest.  The emphasis in the text 
of Rule 90 RPE ICC might be taken to suggest that the standard procedure is that victims 
collectively select their representative(s) and the Court intervenes only as a default 
mechanism.  But the institutional practice to date suggests otherwise. 
 
 Faced with growing numbers of victim participants since the Lubanga case, in which a 
relatively small number of victim participants were represented at the trial essentially by two 
teams,12 the Chambers have increasingly instructed the Registry to devise a proposal on 
representation without first requesting victims to make their own selection and without 
charging the Registry to assist victims to do so.13 The position is complicated further because 
Rule 90 RPE ICC is not the only legal power by which the Chamber may appoint common 
                                                 
11
 See Regulation 112 of the Registry ICC-BD/03-03, 6 March 2006 (Approved by the Presidency), as amended 
on 25 September 2006 and 4 December 2013. 
12
 With four victims outside those teams being represented by the OPCV: Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-T-105-
ENG ET WT 1-63 NBT), Trial Chamber I, 22 January 2009, at 12-13. More recently, in the Al Mahdi case, 
7ULDO&KDPEHU9,,,DFFHSWHGWKHVL[YLFWLPV¶FKRLFHRI&/5VHH'HFLVLRQRQ9LFWLP3DUWLFLSDWLRQDW7ULDODQG
on Common Legal Representation of Victims, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01-01/15-97-Red), Trial Chamber VIII, 8 
June 2016, § 36- DQG 3XEOLF 5HGDFWHG YHUVLRQ RI µ6HFRQG 'HFLVLRQ RQ 9LFWLP 3DUWLFLSDWLRQ DW 7ULDO¶ 
August 2016, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01-01/15-156-Red), Trial Chamber VIII, 12 August 2016, § 11. 
13
 Haslam and Edmunds, supra note 9. For a recent survey that identifies three approaches to organising 
FRPPRQOHJDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQLQWKH,&&¶VFDVHODZVHH+XPDQ5LJKWV:DWFK:KR:LOO6WDQGIRU8V"9LFWLPV¶
Legal Representation at the ICC in the Ongwen Case and Beyond (2017), at 14-20, available on line at 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/ijongwen0817_web.pdf (visited 5 September 2017). 
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legal representation. It may instead prefer to rely on Regulation 80,14 which allows it, in 
FRQVXOWDWLRQZLWKWKH5HJLVWUDUWRPDNHDQDSSRLQWPHQWµZKHUHWKHLQWHUHVWVRIMXVWLFHVR
UHTXLUH¶+HUHDOWKRXJKWKHYLFWLPVPD\EHKHDUGµZKHQDSSURSULDWH¶WKLVVWRSVVKRUWRI
creating a right for them to be consulted, and leaves the circumstances, nature and extent of 
their inclusion in the decision-making firmly within the control of the Chamber.15  
 
Whilst the judges have yet to devise a uniform approach on what amounts to best practice in 
the process of appointing legal representatives,16 common legal representation has become 
increasingly viewed as something of an unavoidable necessity.    Typically, this has entailed 
WKH&RXUWGHWHUPLQLQJWKHFULWHULDDQGLGHQWLW\RIWKHYLFWLPV¶ODZ\HUVDQGSXWWLQJLQSODFH
such supporting field presence as it thinks appropriate. As the ICC continues to develop its 
practice it appears to favour EULQJLQJYLFWLPV¶OHJDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQµLQ-KRXVH¶ by entrusting it 
to the Office of Public Counsel for the Victims (OPCV), in moves that are emblematic of a 
more institutionally managed approach to common legal representation and victim 
participation more generally. Such measures might be considered procedurally attractive to 
the extent that they minimise the number of lawyers appearing for victims in the courtroom 
                                                 
14
 Regulation 80(1), Regulations of the Court (2004), Official documents of the International Criminal Court 
Official ICC-BD/01-03-11. The Pre-Trial Chamber used this provision in Ntaganda: Decision concerning the 
organisation of the Common Legal Representation of Victims, Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06-160), Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, 2 December 2013, at § 25. For some other instances where Reg 80 has been invoked, see Decision 
on Victims' Participation and Victims' Common Legal Representation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing 
and in the Related Proceedings, Laurent Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-138), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 4 June 2012, § 
42 (ZKHUHWKH6LQJOH-XGJHDSSRLQWHGWKH23&9LQSUHIHUHQFHWRWKH5HJLVWU\¶VSURSosal made under Rule 90(3) 
RPE ICC); Decision on victims' representation and participation, Ruto & Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-460), Trial 
Chamber V, 3 October 2012, § 44; anG'HFLVLRQRQ&RQWHVWHG9LFWLPV¶$SSOLFDWLRQVIRU3DUWLFLSDWLRQ/HJDO
Representation of Victims and their Procedural Rights, Ongwen (ICC-02/04-01/15-350, Pre-Trial chamber II, 27 
November 2015, § 19. 
15
 See further Human Rights Watch, supra note 13, at 18-20. 
16
 By contrast with the way in which they have recently identified best practice in respect of the procedures for 
the admission of victim participants in proceedings, see Chambers Practice Manual, February 2016, available 
online at https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/other/Chambers_practice_manual--FEBRUARY_2016.pdf (visited 5 
6HSWHPEHUDW7KH9LFWLPV¶5LJKWV:RUNLQJ*URXSKDVSURSRVHGµWKDWWKH0DQXDOEHDPHQGHGIXUWKHU
to clarify the criteria and process for the appointment of leJDOUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV¶VHH95:*Recommendations 
to the 15th Session of the Assembly of State Parties, November 2016, available online at 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/2016_VRWG_ASP.pdf (visited 5 September 2017), at 3.; and 
see also Human Rights Watch, supra note 13, at 54. 
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thereby reducing the volume of submissions and curtailing unwieldy and protracted trials that 
are GHWULPHQWDOWRWKH,&&¶VVWDQGLQJDQGFODLPVWROHJLWLPDF\7hat said, the reliance on 
common legal representation, and the increasing centralisation of the appointment process 
within the ICC, have proved to be controversial, not least because of the way in which these 
developments belie the emphasis on choice promised by the text of Rule 90 RPE ICC.17  This 
divergence between the promise and reality of choice is also evident when the Court confines 
access to discretionary financial assistance from the Registry to instances where the common 
legal representative is chosen by the Court rather than by the victims themselves under Rule 
90(1) RPE ICC.18 
 
The institution-centric nature of these developments emphasises the importance of consulting 
with victims when common legal representation LVEHLQJRUJDQLVHGVRWKDWYLFWLPV¶LQWHUHVWV
can be incorporated into decision-making processes.  Unsurprisingly then, calls have been 
PDGHIRUJUHDWHUFRQVXOWDWLRQZLWKYLFWLPVLQDELGµto establish some understanding of 
victims' preferences regarding their legal representation¶19 For Killean and Moffett the 
                                                 
17
 See, for instance, REDRESS, Representing Victims before the ICC: Recommendations on the Legal 
Representation System (2015); and Human Rights Watch, supra note 13. 
18
 See 'HFLVLRQRQWKHµ5HTXHVWIRUDGHWHUPLQDWLRQFRQFHUQLQJOHJDODLG¶VXEPLWWHGE\WKHOHJDOUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV
of the victims, Ongwen (ICC-02/04-01/15-445), Trial Chamber IX, 26 May 2016; Decision on contested 
YLFWLPV¶DSSOLFDWLRQVIRUSDUWLFLSDWLRQOHJDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIYLFWLPVDQGWKHLUSURFHGXUDOULJKWVOngwen (ICC-
02/04-01/15-350), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 27 November 2015, at § 18; and for tacit support in earlier decisions of 
other chambers, see Decision concerning the organisation of the Common Legal Representation of Victims, 
Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06-160), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 2 December 2013, at §§ 23-24. Subsequently the Pre-
Trial Chamber acknowledged that the Registrar could authorise financial assistance form the Court under 
5HJXODWLRQVHH'HFLVLRQRQWKH5HJLVWU\¶V5HTXHVWIRUWKHFODULILFDWLRQRQWKH,VVXHRI/HJDO$VVLVWDQFH
Paid by the court for the Legal Representatives of Victims, Ongwen (ICC-02/04-01/15-591), Trial Chamber IX, 
14 November 2016; The Registry, exercising its discretion, subsequently found funding for the external counsel 
chosen by 2,600 of the 4,170 participating victims. See further, Killean and Moffett, supra note 5, at 16-17; and 
C. Denis, VictimV¶Choice vs. Legal Aid? Time for the ICC to Re-think Victims¶ Participation as a whole, 
Avocats San Frontieres, (2016) available on line at http://www.asf.be/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/ASF_VictimsParticipationAsAWhole_20160526_EN.pdf (visited 5 September 2017).  
19
 Proposal for the common legal representation of victims, Laurent Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-120), Registry, 
16 May 2012, § 5. $QH[SHUWUHSRUWFRPPLVVLRQHGE\WKH5HJLVWU\DVSDUWRIDUHYLHZRIWKH&RXUW¶VOHJDODLG
system has UHFRPPHQGHGDOHJDODLGSROLF\IRUYLFWLPV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ5-5RJHUV$VVHVVPHQWRIWKH,&&¶V
Legal Aid System, Global Diligence LLP, (January 2017) available on line at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/itemsDocuments/legalAidConsultations-LAS-REP-ENG.pdf (visited 5 September 2017). 
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capacity of victims to select a representative is a fundamental aspect of victims¶ legal 
agency.20  However, consultations have not always taken place when appointments for 
common legal representation have been made. So, for instance,21 in Banda, Trial Chamber V 
DFFHSWHGWKH5HJLVWU\¶VH[SODQDWLRQWKDWORJLVWLFDODQGUHVRXUFHSUREOHPV rendered the 
Registry unable to consult with victims to assist them to select a common legal 
representative(s) within the timeline set by the Chamber. It also accepted that the Registry 
might therefore draw on views that victims had expressed at an earlier stage of the 
proceedings.22  
 
In interpreting the terms of the Rome Statute that make provision for the arrangement of 
common representation, the Chambers and Registry have lacked consistency, predictability 
and transparency about when and if consultation is to occur and the form any such 
consultation should take. In particular victims have not always been consulted directly. This 
is unfortunate. Consultations with victims about who is to represent their interests in the 
courtroom are important even though they give rise to challenges concerning their 
execution,23 and in the usage of the information that is gathered from them.   One concern is 
that ZKLOVWWKH&KDPEHUV¶FDOOIRUFRQVXOWDWLRQ, and, so, too, its consequential decision 
                                                 
20
 Drawing distinctions between legal, moral and political agency, Killean and Moffett argue that choosing a 
OHJDOUHSUHVHQWDWLYHLVDQLPSRUWDQWSDUWRIWKHH[HUFLVHRIYLFWLPV¶OHJDODJHQF\DQGPD\DOVRFRQWULEXWHWRWKHLU
moral agency, Killean and Moffett, supra note 5, at 10. 
21
 There was also no consultation ahead of the ChaPEHUV¶GHFLVLRQWRDOWHUWKHSUH-trial arrangements for 
common legal representation for the purposes of the trial proceedings in each of the two Kenya cases, see: Ruto 
& Sang, supra QRWHDQG'HFLVLRQRQ9LFWLPV¶5HSUHVHQWDWLRQDQG3DUWLFLSDWLRQMuthaura and Kenyatta, 
(ICC-01/09-01/11-7ULDO&KDPEHU92FWREHU6HHIXUWKHU03HQDDQG*&DUD\RQµ,VWKH,&&
0DNLQJWKH0RVWRIYLFWLP3DUWLFLSDWLRQ"¶The International Journal of Transnational Justice (2013) 518-
535, at 532.  
22
 See Decision on common legal representation, Banda (ICC-02/05-03/09-337), Trial Chamber IV, 25 May 
DQG5HSRUWRQWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH&KDPEHU¶VRUGHULQVWUXFWLQJWKH5HJLVWU\WRVWDUWFRQVXOWDWLRQV
on the organisation of common legal representation, Banda (ICC-02/05-03/09-164-RED), Registry, 21 June 
2011, §§ 13-14. 
23
 In Ruto & Sang WKH5HJLVWU\IRXQGLWUHJUHWWDEOHWKDWµUHVRXUFHFRQVWUDLQWV¶DQGRWKHUZRUNSULRULWLHVPHDQWLW
ZDVRQO\DEOHWRKROGµDWDLORUHGDQGVSHFLILFFRQVXOWDWLRQ¶ZLWKYLFWLPV3URSRsal for the common legal 
representation of victims, Ruto & Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-243), Registry, 1 August 2011, § 8. 
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determining common legal representation, are invariably matters of public record, the same 
cannot always be said for the 5HJLVWU\¶V5HSRUWVRQFRQVXOWDWLRQV.24 It is therefore welcome 
that, although initially treated as confidential, the 5HJLVWU\¶VReport containing the 
consultation response that contributed to the determination of common legal representation 
for the confirmation of charges hearing and related proceedings in Ntaganda is now on the 
record.25 The unavailability of such documents compounds the difficulty of assessing the 
consultation and its outcome, leaving, as it does, important gaps in the information about 
victim satisfaction as well as the indicators by which it was measured.  
 
Other recurring points of contestation have also arisen in the course of proceedings to 
determine common legal representation.  These include: determining the numbers of groups 
into which victims should be divided;26 settling the appropriate balance between international 
and local personnel making up the legal team;27 deciding if the OPCV should be appointed as 
DQµLQWHUQDO¶common legal representative or whether an external lawyer who satisfies the 
,&&¶VHOLJLELOLW\FULWHULD should be appointed.28 Running through these debates is the question 
of what kinds of expertise and knowledge (such as international or local) are, and should be, 
                                                 
24
 See, for example, Proposal for the common legal representation of victims, Laurent Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-
01/11-120), Registry, 16 May 2012, § 5. 
25
 6HH3XEOLF5HGDFWHGYHUVLRQRIWKH³5HJLVWU\¶V,QWHULP5HSRUWRQWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQRIFRPPRQOHJDO
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´,&&-01/04-02/06-141-Conf-Exp) dated 13 November 2013, Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06-141-
Red2), Registry, 4 August 2014. 
26
 See Haslam & Edmunds, supra note 9, at 885. The presumptive approach favours having one group (see, for 
H[DPSOH'HFLVLRQRQ9LFWLPV¶3DUWLFLSDWLRQDQG9LFWLP¶VFRPPRQ/HJDO5HSUHVHQWDWLRQDWWKH&RQILUPDWLRQRI
Charges Hearing and in Related Proceedings, Laurent Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-138), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 4 
June 2012, § 40) unless there are good reasons to the contrary. 
27
 $QGZKHWKHUWKH&/5VKRXOGEHWKHYLFWLPV¶SULPDU\SRLQWRIFRQWDFWORFDOO\ZLWKWKH23&9DWWHQGLQJPRVW
KHDULQJVRQWKH&/5¶VEHKDOIVHHIor example, Decision on Victims Representation, Muthaura and Kenyatta 
(ICC-01/09-02/11-498), Trial Chamber V, 3 October 2012, §§ 40-44 and 70) or vice versa. For a critical 
perspective, see Judge Fulford, International Criminal Courts: Progress Made, Progress Needed (Sir Richard 
May Memorial Lecture, Chatham House, London, 29 October 2014), at 4. Summary available at 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/event/sir-richard-may-memorial-lecture-international-criminal-
courts#sthash.8qU9kGji.dpuf (visited 5 September 2017). 
28
 7KHFRQWURYHUV\JDLQHGPRPHQWXPEHFDXVHRIUHIRUPSURSRVDOVRULJLQDOO\LQFOXGHGDVSDUWRIWKH,&&¶V
ReVision project: see Walleyn, supra note 9, at 1014-15; FIDH, &RPPHQWVRQWKH,&&5HJLVWUDU¶V5H9LVLRQ
proposals in relation to victims (2014) available on line at https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/letter_registar_icc.pdf 
(visited 5 September 2017); and Judge Fulford, supra note 27, at 3-4.   
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prioritised.  Here we develop one particular concern: the extent to which common legal 
representation impacts upon the scope for the expression of contestation by victim 
participants.29 The possibility that the appointment of common legal representation could 
affect the expression of dissentient views on the part of victims in the course of proceedings 
prompts the need to consider how the dissent of victims, particularly dissent about current or 
potential representation, is depicted in this more managed approach to organising 
representation.  This is a question that has come to the fore in Ntaganda with the appearance 
of the statistical victim.   
3 Common Legal Representation in the Ntaganda Case and the 
Emergence of the Statistical Victim 
Bosco Ntaganda has been charged with having committed 13 counts of crimes against 
humanity and five of war crimes between August 2002 and December 2003 during the 
conflict in the Ituri province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).   A large 
number of victims have sought to participate in the case:  by June 2017, there were 2,144 
who had the right to participate.30 In May 2013, the Pre-Trial Chamber II ordered the 
Registry to conduct consultations with victim applicants to gauge their views about the 
appointment of legal representation for them during the pre-trial phase of the proceedings.31 
The 5HJLVWU\¶VReport included an analysis of YLFWLPDSSOLFDQWV¶YLHZV about legal 
representation expressed in the application forms of 462 applicants, who, it was anticipated, 
would constitute µDVLJQLILFDQWSURSRUWLRQRIWKHWRWDODSSOLFDQWVH[SHFWHG¶32 Although the 
Registry carried out consultations in the field with victims and intermediaries, it explicitly 
noted that there were methodological reasons why these should not be viewed µas a technical 
                                                 
29
 See Haslam and Edmunds, supra note 10. 
30
 Seventh Periodic Report on the Victims and their General Situation, Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06-1938), 
Registry, 6 June 2017, § 3. 
31
 Decision Establishing Principles on the Victims' Application Process, Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06-67), Pre-
Trial Chamber II, 28 May 2013, § 46. 
32
 Supra note 25, §7, at footnote 12. 
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VXUYH\RIRSLQLRQ¶; and it noted its µUHVHUYDWLRQVRQWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHQHVVand reliability of 
WKHUHVXOWVSURYLGHG¶ recommending, therefore, that they should be considered µDV
SUHOLPLQDU\DQGIRULQIRUPDWLYHSXUSRVHVRQO\¶33  In December 2013 Pre-Trial Chamber II 
DFFHSWHGWKH5HJLVWU\¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQV for legal representation.  The Registry had 
recommended the formation of two separate victim groupings for the purposes of legal 
representation, that is one set comprising former child soldier victims and the other consisting 
of victims of the attacks, each to be represented by its own separate legal team.34 In line with 
DJURZLQJWUHQGLQWKH&RXUW¶VSUDFWLFHWZRFRXQVHOIURPZLWKLQWKH,&&¶V23&9ZHUH
selected over external lawyers as common legal representatives,35 and the Chamber provided 
that each of them should be assisted by field counsel based in the DRC who were 
DSSURSULDWHO\HTXLSSHGµWRFRPPXQLFDWHGLUHFWO\DQGFORVHO\ZLWKWKHYLFWLPVRQWKH
JURXQG¶.36 In putting these arrangements in place under Regulation 80, the Chamber rejected 
the explicit choice of six counsel that some of the victims had made when they had applied to 
participate in the proceedings.  The Chamber took into account a number of factors, including 
the IDFWWKDWYLFWLPVKDGµH[SUHVVHGGLYHUJHQWYLHZV¶DERXWrepresentation,37 µWKHOLPLWHG
scope of the confirmDWLRQRIFKDUJHVKHDULQJ¶ and the potentially significant financial burden 
that paying for up to six counsel would place on the Court.38  
                                                 
33
 Ibid, at §7 (footnote 11).  The Registry (ibid, § 9) supplemented its consultations in the field with victims and 
intermediaries by having recourse to the results of a survey with victim applicants that had been carried out by 
Avocats Sans Frontières, Victims¶ Consultation on the Grouping for their Legal Representation in the Bosco 
Ntaganda case, November 2013, available on line at 
http://www.uianet.org/sites/default/files/ASF_IJ_Grouping%20victims%20in%20the%20Bosco%20Ntaganda%
20Case.pdf (visited 5 September 2017). 
34
 Decision Concerning the organisation of the Common Legal Representation of Victims, Ntaganda (ICC-
01/04-02/06-160), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 2 December 2013, §§10 and 23. 
35Ibid., § 25. The OPCV had already indicated its ability and willingness to organise two teams if requested by 
the Chamber: see Decision Requesting the VRS and the OPCV to take steps with regard to the legal 
representation of victims in the confirmation of the charges hearing and in related proceedings, Ntaganda (ICC-
01/04-02/06-150-Conf-Ex), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 20 November 2013, §§ 12-13; and Observations of the OPCV 
LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKH6LQJOH-XGJH¶VGHFLVLRQLVVXHGRQ1RYHPEHU Ntaganda (01/04-02/06-156), 
OPCV, 16 January 2014. 
36
 Supra note 34, § 26.   
37
 Ibid., § 23. 
38
 Ibid., §§ 11 and 24.  
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As the case progressed beyond the pre-trial phase the question arose as to whether there was a 
need to modify the YLFWLPV¶existing representation arrangements. The Trial Chamber 
therefore asked the Registry to consult with those victims who had participated in the 
confirmation of charges stage about the prospect of their current legal representatives 
continuing to represent them, and to report back to the Chamber. As a result the Registry 
undertook a second consultation exercise between 25 February and 3 March 2015. This 
consultation involved following up group consultations with individual questionnaires. Then 
on 16 March 2015 the Registry issued its Report to the Chamber.39 This report contained 
statistical information about preferences, with a headline finding that 81 % of the victims 
who had been consulted indicated that they wished to continue with the current arrangements 
for representation.  At the same time the consultation revealed that: 10% wished to change 
legal representation; 14% were not happy with the quality of service; and 27% complained 
that there was not enough contact with their legal representative. Furthermore, 53% felt they 
were not given the opportunity to communicate their views to lawyers ± with 1 in 4 women 
raising concerns about their ability to convey their views in a group.40 
 
On 16 June 2015 the majority of the Chamber considered that there was no reason to depart 
from the current system on representation, in particular no reason to replace the current legal 
representatives with counsel from the DRC.41    This was the case even though the Registry 
had actually recommended WKDWWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQEHPRGLILHGµto ensure 
closer proximity¶ between victims and counsel, and µa more continuous flow of information¶ 
                                                 
39
 Registry's Report, supra note 1. 
40
 A figure that Judge Ozaki emphasised in her dissenting opinion, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ozaki, 
Ntaganda (ICC-01/04/02/06-650-Anx), Trial Chamber VI, 16 June 2015, § 9. 
41
 Second decision on victims' participation, supra note 2. 
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between lawyers and clients.42 Although WKH5HJLVWU\¶VFRQVXOWDWLRQ± and the statistical 
indicators it produced - was not the only justification the Chamber relied upon in settling the 
arrangements for common legal representation, it was one factor. The majority cited the 
5HJLVWU\¶VVXUYH\RIYLFWLPSUHIHUHQFHVto support its conclusion in favour of maintaining the 
status quo. It did so in general terms without commenting upon, or unpacking, the statistical 
GHWDLOVFRQWDLQHGLQWKH5HJLVWU\¶VVXUYH\5HFRJQLVLQJWKDWWKHVXUYH\FDSWXUHGWKHYLHZVRI
the sample under difficult circumstances, the majority:  
«FRQVLGHUHGLWLPSRUWDQWWKDWWKHYDVWPDMRULW\RIWKHYLFWLPVFRQVXOWHGH[SUHVVHG
the wish to retain the current LRVVDQGDVLJQLILFDQWPDMRULW\DSSHDUVµRYHUDOO
FRQWHQW¶ZLWKWKHLUFXUUHQWOHJDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶43 
 Ultimately it found that there was nRµFRQFUHWHUHDVRQ¶WRPRGLI\DV\VWHPWKDWµDSSHDUHGWR
EHIXQFWLRQLQJYHU\ZHOOVRIDU¶44 by appointing counsel from the DRC who were 
geographically closer to the victims.  
 
There are other instances where the Registry has included statistical measures in its reports of 
consultations with victims about their legal representation. When the Registry carried out its 
consultation exercise in Prosecutor v Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blè Goudé it reported that 
91% of those victims who completed questionnaires expressed a wish to maintain the same 
representative for the Trial phase as had previously acted on their behalf.45 The Chamber 
                                                 
42
 5HJLVWU\¶V5HSRUWsupra note 1, at §§ 2 and 26. 
43
 Second decision on victims' participation, supra note 2, at § 30. 
44
 Ibid., §  31. 
45
 3XEOLF5HGDFWHGYHUVLRQRI³5HJLVWU\¶V5HSRUWRQWKH/HJDO5Hpresentation of Victims for the Purpose of the 
Trial pursuant to Decision ICC-02/11-01/11-´QRWLILHGRQ$SULOLaurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé 
Goudè (ICC-02/11-01/15-49-Conf-Exp), Registry, 15 May 2015, § 23. It also found that around 86% µVDLGthey 
EHOLHYHGWKHLUOHJDOUHSUHVHQWDWLYHUHSUHVHQWVWKHPZHOO¶ibid., § 24. 
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noted the statistic.46 Similarly, with the Report accompanying each batch of applications to 
participate in the pre-trial phase of the Ongwen case, the Registry supplied statistical 
LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWYLFWLPV¶SUHIHUHQFHVUHJDUGLQJOHJDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ.47 The Ntaganda case is 
therefore not the only one in which statistics have been used to capture the views and 
preferences of victims, but it is striking in terms of the detail and depth of the numerical data 
made available on the record.  It may also signal something of a new departure in the way 
that the ICC consultation findings are depicted.    
 
Statistics are being looked to elsewhere as a performance management tool at the ICC. Most 
notably the ICC is turning to quantitative measures as one aspect of its initiative to develop 
Court-wide performance indicators as a means to improve efficiency and µGHPRQVWUDWHEHWWHU
its achievements and needs as well allowing State Parties to assesVWKH&RXUW¶VSHUIRUPDQFH
in a strategic manner«.¶48 As part of this on-going project the number of victims assisted and 
represented by the OPCV and/or external representatives in each case is identified as a 
relevant indicator in determining the access victims have to the Court, 49 which is one of four 
goals currently being assessed.50 The Court has deferred its consideration of establishing a 
                                                 
46
 Directions on the conduct of the proceedings, Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudè (ICC-02/11-01/15-
205), Trial Chamber I, 3 September 2015, § 69. 
47
 First Report on Applications to Participate in Proceedings, Dominic Ongwen (ICC-02/04-01/15-303) Registry, 
18 September 2015, §§ 21-23; Second Report on Applications to Participate in Proceedings, Dominic Ongwen 
(ICC-02/04-01/15-327), Registry, 26 October 2015, §§ 5-8; and Third Report on Applications to Participate in 
Proceedings, Dominic Ongwen (ICC-02/04-01/15-344), Registry, 18 November 2015, §§ 5-7. 
48
 Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of state Parties ICC-ASP/13/Res. 5, 17 
December 2014, Annex I, § 7(b).   
49
 6HFRQG&RXUW¶VUHSRUWRQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRISHUIRUPDQFHLQGLFDWRUVIRUWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULPLQDO&RXUW
(2016), available on line at https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/ICC-Second-Court_report-on-indicators.pdf 
(visited 5 September 2017), at § FDQG$QQH[,9,,KHUHDIWHUµ6HFRQG&RXUW¶VUHSRUW¶. Originally the goal 
WREHDVVHVVHGZDVH[SUHVVHGDVµDGHTXDWH¶DFFHVV5HSRUWRIWKH&RXUWRQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRISHUIRUPDQFH
indicators for the International Criminal Court (2015) available on line at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/itemsDocuments/Court_report-development_of_performance_indicators-ENG.pdf (visited 5 September 
2017), at GKHUHDIWHUµ5HSRUWRIWKH&RXUW¶+RZHYHUWKHTXDOLILHUµDGHTXDWH¶ZDVµDEDQGRQHG¶EHFDXVHRI
feedback that, as a WHUPRIDUWWKHFRQFHSWRIµDFFHVVWRMXVWLFH¶VKRXOGQRWEHTXDOLILHG6HFRQG&RXUW¶VUHSRUW
at footnote 5.  
50
 For the other three goals see Report of the Court, supra, note 49, at § 7DQGWKH6HFRQG&RXUW¶VUHSRUWsupra, 
note 49, at § 5.  
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further LQGLFDWRUµUHJDUGLQJWKHVHOHFWLRQRIYLFWLPFRXQVHODQGUHOHYDQWFRQVXOWDWLRQVZLWK
FOLHQWV¶to the next phase of the project because of the µGLYHUVLW\RIUHOHYDQWIDFWRUVDQG
OLPLWHGDYDLODELOLW\RIGDWD¶.51  Therefore, when set in this broader context, what happened in 
the Ntaganda case invites more general consideration of the impact of the emergence of the 
statistical victim on practices concerning the representation of victims.  
 
At one level, the determination of common legal representation in the Ntaganda case can be 
seen as supplying further evidence of a more managed approach towards the organisation of 
collective representation at the ICC.  The production and use of such data may be a justifiable 
way to EDODQFHWKH&RXUW¶VRYHUDOOPDQGDWHRIHQVXULQJWLPHO\DQGIDLUSURFHHGLQJVZKLOVWDW
the same time striving to fulfil the promise found in Rule 90(2) RPE ICC that victims are to 
choose, or be assisted in choosing, their lawyer. However, what is notable about this episode 
is how the institutional process for appointing common legal representatives for victims is 
bolstered by the creation of statistical indicators that purport to record YLFWLPV¶ wishes.  By 
relying in this way on the statistical data it has produced, the Court may have effected a shift 
in how the idea of choice should operate in the context of the RPE. 
  
4 Representing the Victim Statistically 
 
Capturing YLFWLPSDUWLFLSDQWV¶views numerically may be seen as an efficient and attractive 
way to satisfy Rule 90(3) RPE ICC, at least when viewed from the perspective of a resource-
limited institution that is under immense pressure to deliver timely and fair proceedings.  
                                                 
51
 Second CoXUW¶VUHSRUWsupra note 49, at § 83. 
Page 18 of 32 
 
However, as this section shows, relying on statistics is riven with potential pitfalls.  First, the 
Court has greater control over the production and deployment of statistical information than 
those from whom it obtains such information.  Second, the reliance on a headline statistical 
figure may have the effect - albeit unintentionally ± of minimising the significance of other 
important concerns victims may raise about their representation, or indeed their situation 
more generally.  Third, the turn to statistics may have a subtle impact upon practices of legal 
representatives, in part because satisfaction ratings may come to be seen as an appraisal of 
legal representation, even if that is not their intended purpose.  Fourth, statistical indicators 
can de-emphasise the broader political questions that underpin contestation about 
representation.  Taken together the introduction and reliance upon statistical data can operate 
as an additional technology of institutional management, which has the potential to shift the 
terms of the debates concerning representation in favour of institutional interests. 
 
A. Controlling the Production and Use of Statistics 
The Court has greater control over how and what statistical information is collected, and how 
it is used, than those from whom it seeks the information. In the Ntaganda case the Registry 
framed the consultation questions, and it produced and supplied the resulting statistical data 
which the Chamber then drew upon as a contributory factor in making, or at least in support 
of, its decision to re-appoint the common legal representatives (CLRs).  In effect then the 
ICC relied on statistical information it produced as part of the way it justified its practice 
around Rule 90 RPE ICC UHJDUGLQJYLFWLPV¶FKRLFHRIOHJDOUHSUHVHQWDWLon. The key statistical 
indicator of 81% might be seen as a clear majority preference about representation, and 
therefore a neat way of encapsulating the support in favour of the outcome. This is 
presumably how the Registry and the Chamber understand the statistical measure. There 
Page 19 of 32 
 
were, however, fundamental limitations to the consultation and survey that produced the 
statistical findings, some of which were acknowledged.  First, the consultation was inevitably 
confined to only those victims who were already accepted as victim participants during the 
pre-trial stage, 52 therefore omitting the views of those ± potentially large numbers  - who 
might subsequently gain participatory rights. Second, understanding and interpreting the 
statistical results requires some analysis of the questions asked. The Victims Participation and 
Reparations Section (VPRS) devised a written questionnaire that the Registry used as part of 
its consultation exercise. In so doing, the VPRS sought advice from intermediaries who had 
been assisting the legal representatives on µKow best to frame the questions so as to be 
XQGHUVWRRGE\WKHYLFWLPV¶53 As a result they settled on the following five questions:  
1. Does the victim think that she/he has a good understanding of the case because of 
the explanations provided by the lawyer? 
2. Does the victim have the opportunity to communicate his or her opinions to the 
lawyer? 
3. Does the victim feel that the lawyer treats her/him with respect and consideration? 
4. Is the victim happy with the quality of the services provided by the lawyer? 
5. Does the victim want the lawyer to continue representing her/him in the 
proceedings? 54 
It is striking that victims were essentially being asked about their experience of the legal 
service they had received thus far, rather than being canvassed on any alternatives for their 
future representation, or being offered assistance in exercising a choice in the sense suggested 
                                                 
52
 Registry's Report, supra note 1, at § 6.  
53
 Ibid., § 8. 
54
 Ibid. (footnotes omitted). 
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by Rule 90 RPE ICC. None of the five questions included in the questionnaire are open-
ended. Moreover, in varying degrees, they relate to the incumbent lawyers and the way they 
have conducted themselves professionally in representing their clients up to this point in the 
proceedings. That said, it seems that in the meetings with victims that preceded the 
administration of the questionnaire, WKH9356JRWDµVWURQJVHQVHWKDWWKHYLFWLPVGLGKDYH
ideas about what they saw as important qualities, and what they wanted from their legal 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV¶55 Whatever merits there may be in this set of closed questions, and however 
much care the Registry took in devising them, there is a risk that ultimately they reflect the 
views and assumptions of other actors, including the institution, about the interests of those 
being consulted. They may not therefore constitute the optimum vehicle for engaging victims 
as fully and directly as possible in selecting their legal representative. 
 
Third, the Registry noted the general disempowerment experienced by many victims - an 
unspecified number - which negatively affected their ability to assess the calibre of 
representation.56 They also considered that an insufficient number of meetings with their 
lawyer and a lack of information about their work at The Hague contributed to victims 
feeling uneasy about evaluating the experiences of their legal representatives.57 Fourth, the 
timing of the consultation was problematic. It occurred when the legal proceedings had not 
given rise to many visits to victims on the ground.58   Fifth, of the total of 1,120 victims who 
PLJKWKDYHEHHQFRQVXOWHGµSUDFWLFDOFKDOOHQJHV¶RIWLPHDQGJHRJUDSK\PHDQWWKDWWKH
                                                 
55
 Ibid., µ7KHVHLQFOXGHGIUHTXHQWLQWHUDFWLRQVWKHRSSRUWXQLW\IRULQGLYLGXDOPHHWLQJVUHJXODU





 Ibid.  
58




Page 21 of 32 
 
Registry decided to try to meet a sample of 10-15 %.59 7KH5HJLVWU\¶V5HSRUWFRQVLGHUed that 
WKLVZDVµEURDGO\UHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKHRYHUDOOSDUWLFLSDWLQJSRSXODWLRQ¶60 Yet, it is notable 
that as things turned out it was only able to consult with two women from the category of 
child soldiers.  Finally, the Registry noted, amongst other things, that common legal 
representation is a µFRPSOH[DQGDEVWUDFWFRQFHSWIRUPDQ\YLFWLPV¶,61 and that there was a 
µORZOHYHORIXQGHUVWDQGLQJ about the Court, the different actors of the Court, participation of 
victims and the role of common legal representatives¶62 Indeed the questionnaire referred in 
generic terms to the victims¶ µlawyer¶LWEHLQJµWRRFRPSOLFDWHGWRDVNYLFWLPVWRPDNHD
distinction between the CLR from the OPCV and the LeJDO$VVLVWDQWEDVHGLQWKH'5&¶ a 
difference which the Registry reported was often not present in the responses it received.63  
 
By itself then the headline figure of 81% provides at best a partial and incomplete picture 
because it excises the critical context in which it was obtained. When viewed in the wider 
context and circumstances of the survey, it becomes clear that it is no more than an imperfect 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIYLFWLPV¶YLHZVDQGRQHZKLFKLVOLNHO\WRFKDQJHRYHUWLPH. Statistics that 
create a majority and minority are themselves a representation of views that is sensitive both 
to time and context.  The fact that opinions are susceptible to fluctuate in the course of legal 
proceedings and beyond, complicates future justifications for legal representation that are 
rooted in past statistical indicators.  $GPLWWHGO\E\GHWDLOLQJLWVPHWKRGRORJ\WKH5HJLVWU\¶V
Report in the Ntaganda case acknowledges these factors that qualify the statistics it produces.  
However, over time it is likely that they will be forgotten, or become less visible and 
prominent than the headline indicators of victim preference.  
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 Registry's Report, supra note 1, at § 6. 
60
 Ibid., at note 14. 
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 Ibid, at notes 16 and 23. 




The deployment of statistics leaves a number of immediate questions unanswered such as 
how small a majority would have been regarded as enough to support the outcome; or, in 
other words, how low would the Court have been prepared to go in accepting the statistical 
indicator of preference?  The lower the Court is prepared go the more collective victim 
representation ± and therefore participation ± becomes.64  The reliance on statistics also 
brings an additional concern.   Relying on a headline statistical figure may have the effect - 
albeit unintentionally ± of minimising the significance of other important concerns victims 
may raise about their representation, or indeed their situation more generally. This is not 
simply a problem that results from the turn to statistical indicators.   In undertaking their 
work at the Court legal representatives must arrive at a common position across a large 
number of victims. As the Chamber observed in its Second dHFLVLRQRQYLFWLPV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQ
in the trial: 
«victims participating solely through a common legal representative only engage 
with the Court through that legal representative. In such cases, the LRVs must 
ultimately adopt a uniform position across a vast number of participating victims.65 
The Chamber therefore appears to recognise, if not tacitly endorse, the fact that minority 
views are inevitable casualties in the representation of large numbers of victims.  Yet, even if 
it is inescapable that VRPHYLFWLPV¶FRQFHUQVmay be side-lined in this way, statistical 
indicators can compound this.  The emergence of the statistical victim may therefore 
contribute to the view, that from the perspective of legal representation, a minority is seen as 
                                                 
64
 Discussing representation at the ECCC, Killean and Moffett observe that representation practices require us to 
DVNµZKRFRQVWLWXWHVDSDUW\WRWKHWULDOWKHFLYLOSDUWLHVDVLQGLYLGXDOVRUDµFRQVROLGDWHGJURXS¶¶.LOOHDQDQG
Moffett, supra note 5, at 21. 
65
 Supra note 2, at § 35. Emphasis added. 
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inevitable.   This raises the question whether legal representatives will end up accepting the 
need to cater for the interests and concerns of 81% - or however low an indicator the Court is 
prepared to accept - assuming these interests and concerns can be identified.  This is not a 
criticism of counsel.  Rather, these comments are intended to highlight and spark a debate 
about the ways in which the emergence of the statistical victim may impact upon, and shift, 
expectations around representation.  
 
C. Statistics and the Impact on Legal Representation 
The 5HJLVWU\¶VFRQVXOWDWLRQH[HUFLVHZDVQRWGHVLJQHGWREHDQDSSUDLVDORIWKHZRUNthe legal 
representatives had done;66 and neither are our comments. But at the same time statistical and 
other satisfaction ratings can be viewed in that way. This becomes all the more unavoidable 
when, as in the Ntaganda case, decisions about appointments are made more than once, with 
a consultation taking place part way through the proceedings when victim participants have 
already been represented by counsel and their teams. Here the context of the appointing 
decision seems tantamount to determining if the existing lawyers should be replaced. A 
perception that the process may be viewed in this way gains traction when one remembers the 
terms of the five questions chosen by the Registry for its consultation with victims.67  All this 
may well place their legal representatives in a potentially invidious position. In the Ntaganda 
case, the WZRH[LVWLQJYLFWLPV¶OHJDOUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVproduced a joint submission,68 in which 
they responded to the 5HJLVWU\¶V5eport.  They emphasised that they had met with their 
clients and had checked with them that they were content with the arrangements for 
representation; and they claimed that the victims appreciated the work the legal 
                                                 
66A point Judge Ozaki makes in the preliminary remarks in her Partly Dissenting Opinion, supra note 40, at § 4. 
67
 Registry's Report, supra note 1, at § 8 (set out, supra, in the text following note 53).  
68
 Joint Submission, supra note 58.  
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representatives had done and felt that attention was given to their concerns.69 The 
representative of the victims of the attack challengeGWKH5HJLVWU\¶VReport in so far as it 
questioned the accessibility and expertise of counsel in the field,70 but, understandably, not its 
VWDWLVWLFDOILQGLQJVDERXWWKHYLFWLPV¶ZLVKHVRUWKHZD\LQZKLFKWKRVHVWDWLVWLFDOUHVXOWVKDG
been derived.   To this end, they, too, had recourse to statistical indicators to convey the 
nature and extent of their engagement with those they had been representing. In this way they 
recorded how they and the field counsel had travelled to Ituri 29 times to meet with victims in 
2014; met 960 of the 980 victims of the attacks numerous times; and also held one or more 
meetings with 134 of the 140 child soldier victim participants involved in the pre-trial stage.71 
It is almost as if counting these interactions are effectively being used, to borrow the words of 
Sally Engle Merry from a different context, DVµSUR[LHV¶IRUQRWPHDVXULQJ± or being able to 
measure - client satisfaction with the prevailing arrangements for legal representation more 
fully.72 
 
All this raises the broader question of how might affected victims, whether consulted or not, 
be able to argue against the indicator and its use? Victims not only lack influence in how the 
statistical indicator is produced, they are not in a position to challenge it directly. The most 
REYLRXVFRQGXLWIRUYLFWLPV¶REMHFWLRQVLVWKHLUOHJDOUHSUHVHQWDWLYH<HWLIWKHLUOHJDO
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV¶FRQWLQXHGDSSRLQWPHQWLVLQTXHVWLRQWKLVPD\UDLVHFRQFHUQVDERXWDFRQIOLFW
of interest and may result in legal representatives feeling the need to justify the ways in which 
they have conducted their duties.   
                                                 
69
 Ibid., § 21-22. 
70
 Ibid., § 30 
71
 Ibid., § 18. 
72
 For example, Merry argues (supra note 4, at S 84) that 1*2VIDFHGZLWKWKHQHHGWRPHDVXUHµLQFUHDVHG
DZDUHQHVVRIKXPDQULJKWV¶UHVRUWWRFRXQWLQJµWUDLQLQJVHVVLRQV¶DVµSUR[LHVIRUWKHVHDFFRPSOLVKPHQWV¶$V
part of its work RQGHYLVLQJSHUIRUPDQFHLQGLFDWRUVDWWKH,&&WKH6HFRQG&RXUW¶VUHSRUWKDVLGHQWLILHGWKH
µ>G@HJUHHRIVDWLVIDFWLRQH[SUHVVHGE\YLFWLPVDERXWWKHLUSDUWLFLSDWLRQ¶DVDQLQGLFDWRUWKDWLVµLQKHUHQWO\
GLIILFXOWWRPHDVXUH¶6HFRQGFRXUW¶VUHSRUWsupra note 49, at § 81(d). 
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D.  Decontextulised Statistics  
The turn to statistical indicators can de-emphasise the broader political questions that 
underpin contestation about representation, thereby contributing to more managerially driven 
decisions.  As Sally Engle Merry argues, VWDWLVWLFVµreplace judgments on the basis of the 
values or politics with apparently more rational decision-making on the basis of statistical 
LQIRUPDWLRQ¶73  In the Ntaganda case, a key question that ran through the judicial debate 
about representation - a question that divided the majority view from the minority - was 
whether local or international personnel should represent victims.  This is a political question 
in its broadest sense.   
 
In her partly dissenting opinion Judge Ozaki emphasised that µSUR[LPLW\¶RIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ
was key.74 µProximity¶of representation ± in a broadly conceived sense 75 - was especially 
important EHFDXVHRIWKHULVNWKDWYLFWLPV¶SHUVSHFWLYHVµFDQEHFRPHILOWHUHGRXWLQWKHUHOD\
IURPDYLOODJHLQ,WXULWRWKHFRXUWURRPLQ7KH+DJXH¶.76  For these reasons she emphasised 
the potential importance of victims being represented by counsel who are independent of the 
court structure and based in the DRC not least because µYLFWLPV¶LQWHUHVWVPD\QRWDOZD\V
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 Merry, supra note 4, at S 85. 
74
 For Judge Ozaki the existing legal representatives had been appointed for the confirmation of charges hearing 
only and whilst µcontinuity of representation¶WKURXJKRXWWKHSURFHHGLQJVwas desirable, it was not 
determinativeDQGVLQFHWKHFKDUJHVKDGEHHQFRQILUPHGLWZDVµLQFXPEHQW¶RQWKH&KDPEHUWRFRQGXFWD
review: supra note 40, at § 2. 
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 *RLQJEH\RQGµJHRJUDSKLFFORVHQHVV¶DQGµWKHDFFHVVLELOLW\RI/59WRWKHLUFOLHQWV¶WRLQFOXGHµLPSRUWDQWO\, 
WKH/59¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHFXOWXUHFRQWH[WDQGSHUVRQDOVLWXDWLRQRIWKHYLFWLPV± each being essential to 
WKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWUXVWEHWZHHQWKHYLFWLPVDQGWKHLUFRXQVHO¶ibid., 6HHDOVRWKH0DMRULW\¶VUHIHUHQFHWR
these considerations: Second decision on victims' participation, supra note 2, at § 29. 
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 Supra note 40, at §14.  The majority also considered the importance of proximity but noted that proximity 
µGRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\UHTXLUHSK\VLFDOSUR[LPLW\¶6HFRQGGHFLVLRQRQYLFWLPV¶SDUWLFLSation, supra note 2, at § 
28. 
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correspond to WKRVHRIWKH&RXUWDVDQLQVWLWXWLRQ¶77  The appointment of representatives 
raises broader questions of fairness relating to the designation of local counsel as legal 
assistants within the LRV team structure  ZKHQRUGLQDULO\µLWZRXOGEHRIPXWXDOEHQHILW
both to the proceedings and to local counsel, for victim representation to be led from the 
JURXQG¶78  Clearly, the whole question of how to balance internal and external representation 
has become highly charged with the ,&&¶Vapproach to it shifting over time. As tKH5HJLVWU\¶V
Report in the Ntaganda case recognises, different Chambers have taken different approaches 
to these matters in different cases.79 Based on his interviews with lawyers and ICC staff for 
his expert report on legal aid at the ICC, Rogers observed that the:  
evolving and unpredictable nature RIYLFWLPV¶UHSUHVHQWDWLRQKDVOHGWRDQXQKHDOWK\
competition between the external counsel and the OPCV primarily relating to who 
should lead the representation and manage teams.80   
These issues and concerns also formed a strand that ran through the debates surrounding the 
5HJLVWU\¶V5H9LVLRQ project¶V proposals, which initially included proposals to make the 
provision of in-house representation of victims the norm, and doing so within the broader 
context of WKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDVLQJOH9LFWLP¶V2IILFH.81  Although this plan for structural 
re-organisation is currently on hold,82 the complex issues of policy and practicalities 
surrounding the appropriate model for victim representation at the ICC look set to remain 
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 Supra note 40, at §13.  
78
 Ibid., DW)RUWKH5HJLVWU\¶VSHUVSHFWLYHVHH5HJLVWU\¶V5HSRUWsupra note 1, at § 24. 
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 Rogers, supra note 19, at § 279.   
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 Draft, Registry, ReVision Project: Basic Outline of Proposals to Establish Defence and Victims Offices 
(2014) available on line at 
http://www.uianet.org/sites/default/files/Registry_ReVision_BasicOutline_Defence_Victims_Offices_0.pdf 
(visited 5 September 2017), at 4-5.  
82
 Registry, Comprehensive Report on the Reorganisation of the Registry of the International Criminal Court 
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contentious and in a state of flux for the foreseeable future.83 However, what is abundantly 
clear is that these broader questions are not easily reducible to statistical evaluation, nor can 
they, or should they, be divorced from their practical and political context.  This is 
particularly important because their determination undoubtedly impacts significantly upon 
the effectiveness of the representation provided. 
 
5. An Ironic Twist  
The Chambers¶ reliance on a majority, expressed in the form of a de-contextualised headline 
figure, risks glossing over dissenting views held by victims about their representation.  At the 
same time the legitimacy of the consultations, upon which the managerial approach depends, 
requires some dissent.  The result is that whilst consultations may contribute to the move 
towards a more managed approach to determining representation they have an additional and 
doubtless unintended consequence. They put on the legal record ± in part through statistical 
indicators - the existence of dissentient voices about representation.  These in turn present a 
significant and visible challenge to the more managerial and efficiency-driven legal climate.  
This opens up a gulf between the statistical victim and dissenting victim, a gulf that serves to 
challenge WKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKH,&&¶Vregime of victim participation can and does fulfil the 
claim of offering meaningful representation for victim participants.  Admittedly, to some 
extent the explanation for this disconnect can be found in factors to which the legal 
representatives - and the Court ± have limited capacity to respond. This much can be seen in 
the Ntaganda case where the legal representatives of the victims emphasised some of the 
challenges and obstacles in the way of the representation they had been able to provide in the 
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 $V5RJHUVREVHUYHVLQKLV5HSRUWSURSRVLQJUHIRUPWROHJDODLGDWWKH,&&µ)LQGLQJWKHULJKWV\VWHPIRU
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proceedings up until that point.84   These included some of the expectations their clients 
expressed to them. For instance, as regards child soldier victims, their legal representative 
explained: 
Indeed, when meeting their lawyers, their first interest is not always to listen to the 
latest developments of the proceedings but for their lawyers to contribute financially 
to alleviate their daily struggles.  The explanations provided as to why this is 
impossible might be seen by victims as a non-recognition or a refusal to understand 
their daily reality as suggested by the results of the consultation conducted by the 
Registry but the explanation is obviously very far from this perception.85 
However reasonable the expectations victims have of the international community, and, more 
specifically the ICC, the gap between them and what is deliverable undoubtedly presents a 
significant and real challenge to providing representation in practice.  As the other common 
legal representative, who had been appointed to represent victims of the attacks, pointed out, 
WKHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV¶REOLJDWLRQ was µQRWWRDGGUHVVWKHSULPDU\QHHGVRIWKHYLFWLPV due to the 
fact they had suffered repeated human rights violations over a long period of time¶EXWµWKH
substantive issues related to victim participation¶.86 In this context it was observed that 
victims had µZURQJH[SHFWDWLRQV¶SDUWLFXODUO\DURXQG the tangible help they could expect 
from the Court at this stage.87 Despite this, the representative thought that µthe victims in their 
majority have understood their interest to participate in the proceedings, as well as the need to 
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 To take another example from the broader context of representation, the Second Periodic Report on the 
Victims and Their General Situation emphasised that alongside their ongoing economic and psychological 
difficulties, many victims of the attack simply did not have the resources or access to telephones to 
communicate with their legal team. It also emphasised that not only had they received no help from TFV or 
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General Situation, Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06-889-AnxA), Registry, 6 October 2015. 
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FRQWULEXWHWRWKHUHVHDUFKIRUWKHWUXWK¶ 88 Clearly the role of the legal representative is 
directed at giving legal advice about particLSDWLRQDQGSUHVHQWLQJKLVRUKHUFOLHQW¶VLQWHUHVWV
and concerns in the courtroom via the recognised procedural avenues. The challenge for the 
lawyer is to navigate the thin line between giving such legal advice, and doing so without 
glossing over victims¶DFWXDOLQWHUHVWVDVYLFWLPV¶WKHPVHOYHVSHUFHLYHWKHPVLFWLPV¶
specific interests in participation may not always correspond with the legal rationale that 
underpins victim participation.  
 
 At one level this gulf that the Ntaganda case reveals between the ICC and the subjects of its 
practice may not tell us much that is new about the challenges of representing victims.89  
However, it is precisely through consultations with victims about how they are to be legally 
represented that many of these concerns, to which the ICC has only limited capacity to 
respond, are now permanently captured and documented.  In some small way, then, these 
statistics may be read back against the Court, putting the limitations of international criminal 
justice firmly on the legal (and statistical) record.  
 
6. Conclusion: The Way Ahead 
How victims are represented in debates about their own representation plays a central role in 
determining the extent to which victims are treated as autonomous agents in international 
criminal law.  This is equally true in respect of each of the two senses of what it means to be 
represented. How victims get a voice in decision-making processes about who is to legally 
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Their General Situation, Ntaganda (ICC-01/4-02/06-632-AnxA), Registry, 8 June 2015; and the Second 
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represent them, and how victims are depicted in such decision-making processes, are not 
matters that simply relate to the mechanics of the courtroom, nor are they confined to 
determining how to make the best of limited resources of institutional time and money. They 
are ultimately about the power to speak for and on behalf of victims, and they impact upon 
the way in which the ICC portrays victims both within its processes and also to the wider 
world.   The sorts of consultations with a sample of victim participants that took place in the 
Ntaganda case might be considered welcome to the extent that they appear to involve those 
who are to be represented in the choice of who is to represent them.  However, we sound a 
cautionary note about the recourse to statistics resulting from such consultations. Not only do 
figures produced by a consultation exercise of this kind necessarily remain, at best, a 
representation, but the emergence of the statistical victim also offers the potential to shift the 
terms of debates concerning representation in favour of institutional interests. This is because 
of the particular quality of statistics and indicators.  The advent of the statistical victim, 
resulting as it does from a well-intentioned desire to ensure greater consultations about 
YLFWLPV¶wishes, has the potential to buttress a more managerial approach towards 
representation that is based on an institutional claim to be acting with the interests and wishes 
of the majority in mind.   By its very nature the claim recognises that there may be a minority 
whose dissentient views about their representation may have to be sacrificed.  This gulf 
between the statistical and dissenting (or contesting) victim poses a challenge to a system of 
victim participation that purports to rest upon the meaningful representation of its subjects.   
 
 
The ICC must of course balance the interests of multiple participants in its quest to deliver 
timely and fair trials.  This may lead the Court to devise managerial initiatives that may in 
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fact be, or which at the very least may be perceived to be, in tension with maximising 
meaningful participation for victims. Timely and fair trials are also very likely to be in the 
interests of many victims and not simply about ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the institution.  Our argument is not that individual YLFWLPV¶LQWHUHVWVQHFHVVDULO\FDQDQG
should always take priority over the interests of other participants, including other victims. 
Nor is it contended that there is anything inherently antipathetic to fulfilling the Rome 
6WDWXWHV¶PDQGDWHWRYLFWLPV, when the ICC, especially the Registry and Chambers, devise or 
adjust its operational practices to provide for collective legal representation in the court room.  
But it is important to reflect critically on such developments. In this respect our concern is 
with the value of using statistics as a technique of representing and resolving debates about 
the representation of victims. One response to this concern might be to more fully recognise 
and identify the pitfalls of relying on statistical indicators as a means of capturing the views 
of victims. On this view statistics, if deployed with care and in a way that explicitly 
acknowledges any contextual limitations, could play a constructive and meaningful role in 
measuring victim satisfaction, and perhaps other areas of international criminal justice. That 
said, even if attaching caveats to the published numerical data is feasible, continuing to 
record statistics may still be enough to carry with it the risks we have identified in this article.  
Admittedly these may appear to be relatively low-level risks, where, as in Ntaganda, 
statistical indicators are but one determinant that Chambers rely upon when making decisions 
about common legal representation, especially where such indicators are a subsidiary rather 
than a principal basis for the determination. Yet, it could prove problematic if their use in 
making these important decisions became more widespread and pronounced. Therefore the 
more preferable way forward is for the burgeoning deployment of statistics that record the 
outcome of consultations ± even as subsidiary means ± to be abandoned altogether.  For, by 
creating the appearance of having successfully engaged with those being consulted, statistical 
Page 32 of 32 
 
indicators may actually help deflect attention from where the focus needs to be, which is on 
how the Court can best organise and represent its consultations with victims.  
